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VISUALIZING THE LAW: METHODS FOR MAPPING
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND DRAWING ANALOGIES
Matthew J. McCloskey
Abstract: Visualization of information is currently touted in many major disciplines as the
best way to manage large amounts of data and make information intuitively accessible. The
law suffers from the same information complexity as other disciplines, but has heretofore
failed to investigate the possibilities of approaching the law visually. This Comment employs
the metaphor of legal map-making as a way to introduce the concept of visualizing the law. It
presents two methods for making legal maps. The first is based on visualizing the law's
organizing metaphors, using examples of "Evidence as a Bridge" and "Negligence as an
Eight-Armed Balancing Scale." The second provides a template approach to case synthesis,
illustrated by an analysis of the copyright case Sony Corporation ofAmerica v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. Each example is a "map" of the law, in that it provides visual guidance for
understanding legal concepts. The methods and examples presented are intended to provide a
starting place for legal thinkers to investigate the possibilities of visualizing the law as a way
to increase clarity and efficiency when analyzing and communicating legal issues.
"One of the pleasures afforded to a senior justice, freed from
many of the pressing demands of the judicial agenda, is the chance
to take a step back and to survey the larger legal landscape in
which state courts function."'
"By the 1970s and '80s, the legal landscape had altered
significantly."2
"An assessment of the legal landscape existing at the time
petitioner's conviction and sentence became final bolsters this
conclusion. 3
Where is this legal landscape everyone is talking about? Is it real?
How can one get a glimpse of the legal landscape? Surely it would be
helpful to see it instead of just read about it.
In order to lead clients on the right path, lawyers must be able to
navigate what many call the legal landscape. Unfortunately, instead of a
compass, a map, or a view from a high peak, lawyers are equipped only
with reams and reams of text-black letters printed on white pages,
1. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State
Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1543, 1543 (1997).
2. Harold Hongiu Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599, 2624
(1997).
3. O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1970 (1997). A Westlaw search in the law review and
legal publication database (TP-ALL), performed on January 17, 1998, for the term "legal landscape"
produced 1263 documents. The same search in the federal case law database (ALLFEDS) produced
453 documents.
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constantly demanding attention. How can lawyers get a clear view of the
law when all these words are in the way? (Figure 1)
Figure 1
The answer is visualization. Visualization is the cutting-edge
technique for managing the massive amounts of information used in
many disciplines.4 Lawyers could benefit greatly by following suit,
symbolically pushing the stacks of words aside and learning to see the
law. Seeing the legal landscape can provide a way to remember the law,
a way to learn the law, and even a way to synthesize case law. There is
no reason to be absolutely wed to text, especially when making maps of
the law could so greatly increase clarity and efficiency in legal analysis
and communication.
As a way to introduce the possibilities of approaching the law
visually, this Comment employs the metaphor of legal map-making. A
legal map is a mediation device between the law and a client's needs to
4. Visualization of quantitative information-almost universally referred to as "scientific
visualization" because of its most prevalent use in the hard sciences--is designed to transform
masses of data into intuitively accessible images. See, e.g., Data risualization in Molecular Science:
Tools for Insight and Innovation (Jack E. Bowie ed., 1995); Frontiers of Scientific Visualization 2-3
(Clifford A. Pickover & Stuart K. Tewksbury eds., 1994) (discussing use of visualization in hard
sciences, including chemistry, physics, biology, fluid dynamics, and architecture); D. Dorling,
Visualizing Changing Social Structure from a Census, 27 Env't & Plan. A 353, 353 (1995)
(cartography); John Douglas, Visualizing Complex Systems, EPRI J., Dec. 1994, at 18, 19-20
(monitoring power plants); Aaron M. Ellison, Right Between the Eyes, 44 Bioscience 622, 622
(1994) (reviewing William S. Cleveland, Visualizing Data (1993) (statistics and social sciences));
James Martin, Beyond Pie Charts and Spreadsheets, Computerworld, May 27, 1996, at 37, 37
(business); Jack Weber, Visualization: Seeing Is Believing, Byte, Apr. 1993, at 120, 120; Jonathan
M. Unger, Visualizing Dose Distributions and Anatomy in Three-Dimensional Radiation Treatment
Planning (1992) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Washington) (on file with University of
Washington Engineering Library) (medicine and engineering). Visualization is so widespread as an
approach to managing information that some have declared it a new discipline or area of study. See,
e.g., Richard Mark Friedhoff& William Benzon, The Second Computer Revolution: Visualization 16
(1989).
Vol. 73:163, 1998
Visualizing the Law
make a decision, a tool to be used by lawyers acting as legal guides. As
travelers use maps of a physical landscape to decide the best way to go,
lawyers create and use maps of the legal landscape to counsel clients on
the best way to go.
Legal maps, however, are not limited to two dimensional pictures of
legal rivers, mountains, deserts, and lakes; they take many forms,
including legal machines, symbolic paintings, three dimensional graphs,
flow charts, Venn diagrams, or even sketches on a yellow legal pad. It is
the function of a legal map as a tool and not its form that is important. A
legal map is an approach to thinking about the law, not a graphic item to
be produced for its own sake.
The purpose of presenting methods for visualizing the law is to give
lawyers a more effective way to conceive of legal issues and
communicate them to their clients. This is neither an idyllic nor
theoretical endeavor; the hope is to assist lawyers and clients to make
informed strategic decisions.
The first method, presented in Part I of this Comment, is based on
visualizing the law's organizing metaphors. To illustrate the role of
metaphors as organizing tools and demonstrate the method of drawing
them out, two examples will be presented. The first example describes
and draws out the metaphor of "Evidence as a Bridge." The second
example, "Negligence as an Eight-Armed Balancing Scale," describes
and draws out Judge Learned Hand's classic negligence calculus from
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,' as captured in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.6
The second method, presented in Part II of this Comment, employs a
template approach to case synthesis. The template is derived from a well-
known intellectual property case, Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.7 The demonstration shows both how to
create a template, and how to draw and compare cases using the
template. The examples presented are legal maps born of visualizing the
law. Part I differs from Part II only in the specific technique employed to
map the legal landscape.
5. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
6. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 291-93 (1965).
7. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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I. CREATING LEGAL MAPS BY DRAWING ORGANIZING
METAPHORS
"Law may make use of art, and art of law."8
The law is replete with visual metaphors and symbolism. In fact, upon
first encountering the "seamless web" of the law, securities trading
subject to "blue sky" laws, property's "bundle of sticks," the "fixed star"
of constitutional principles, "yellow dog" contracts, "bright line" or
"black letter" rules, "color of title," and the ever-present effort to
"square" laws with prior precedent, an outsider could reasonably expect
the study of the law to be much more colorful than the reams of
monotonous black and white print ensconced in the law library.' But
these visual symbols and metaphors are more than colorful dress for
plain, technical bodies of law; they are organizing tools, giving thematic
order to an often randomly accreted common law. For example, while
different property rights have developed at different times and in
different contexts, the metaphor of a "bundle of sticks" gives uniformity
to the concept of property rights.
But visual metaphors go beyond the status of mere tools. They are
often so normative that they do not simply communicate an existing
thought, but determine or create the thought. In their influential book,
Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson present a compelling
analysis of how metaphors can be more than mere "device[s] of the
poetic imagination and... rhetorical flourish," instead serving as
structural concepts that govern our everyday functioning."°
By simply examining linguistic usage and being aware of metaphors,
one can draw out and elucidate these structural concepts from legal texts.
As an illustration, Lakoff and Johnson use an example familiar to most
attorneys. Examining the way people talk about an argument leads to an
understanding of the organizing metaphor for arguments:
"Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his arguments.
I've never won an argument with him.
8. Gustav Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in 4 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series: The Legal
Philosophies ofLask; Radbruch, andDabin 137 (Kurt Wilk trans., 1950).
9. The examples of visual metaphors are borrowed from Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of
Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 Cardozo
L. Rev. 229,230-31 (1994).
10. George Lakoff& Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By 3 (1980).
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You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments.""
The metaphor organizing these statements is that argument is war. If
one assumes this organizing metaphor, whether explicitly or implicitly,
one will likely approach argument as a battle.
The "fruit and tree" metaphor in tax law is a wonderful example of
how a metaphor, first used as a means of explaining a legal issue,
becomes a normative concept in a specific area of the law. In Lucas v.
Earl,2 Justice Holmes described an income-producing asset as a "tree,"
and any income produced by that asset as the "fruit" of the "tree."' 3 The
metaphor became so normative in the field that scholars debate not only
the underlying tax policies, but also the metaphor itself. 4 One
commentator remarked that "Justice Holmes' metaphor-the fruits of a
taxpayer's labor cannot be attributed to 'a different tree from that on
which they grew'-has given rise to a whole body of case law that has
attempted to jam facts into a metaphor."' 5
Drawing out this type of organizing metaphor and making it explicit is
one way to map the legal landscape. Because these metaphors are
structural and govern how people think about the law, the ability to
visualize the metaphor is the ability to visualize the law.
The process of drawing out an organizing metaphor is just that, a
process. It is an approach to thinking about the law. The following
presentation illustrates both the process for making a legal map and the
resulting legal map. As a process, the suggested methods may at times
migrate from one approach to another. Questioning the accuracy or
integrity of certain graphics and revising images and logical conclusions
are important elements of the process. By including change and allowing
the ideas to migrate, this presentation shows a method of legal map
making.
11. Id. at 4.
12. 281 U.S. Ill, 114-15 (1930).
13. Id. at 115.
14. See, e.g., Estate of Stranaban v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 1973) (noting in
connection with tree and fruit metaphor that "metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving if') (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave.
Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.)).
15. Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies
506 (3d ed. 1995).
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A. "Evidence as a Bridge"
CRIMINAL CASE
Presumption
of innocence Conviction
Figure 2
Knowing rules of evidence is like knowing how to build a bridge
across a canyon. (Figure 2) For example, assume you are a prosecutor in
a criminal case. You begin each case on the "presumption of innocence"
side of the canyon and need to get across to the "conviction" side. The
gap between the two sides corresponds to the burden of proof. While a
prima facie burden would be represented as a narrow canyon, the burden
of proof in a criminal case-beyond a reasonable doubt-is a wide
chasm.
Your goal in mounting an evidentiary case is to get to the other side,
to get a conviction. To do so, you must build an evidentiary bridge strong
enough to support the weight of the doubt of the trier of fact. The rules of
evidence describe how to build that bridge: what types of materials to
use, how long each individual piece must be, and how they fit together.
To get to the other side you must build a strong bridge according to the
legal specifications and requirements.
This introductory description of "Evidence as a Bridge" is an example
of a type of visualization that provides a powerful way to remember the
law. The metaphor of a bridge creates a visual picture of the process of
mounting an evidentiary case, which serves as a simple and powerful
reminder of basic evidentiary rules. When faced with the task of
mounting an evidentiary case, remembering the metaphor of bridge-
building can provide a structured approach to thinking about the rules of
evidence.
Vol. 73:163, 1998
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However, simply being shown a helpful image is not as important as
learning to create one's own helpful images. What follows is a
description of the type of process through which one could draw this
image of "Evidence as a Bridge." Observing the process of interrogating
a legal text and drawing out organizing metaphors should foster an
understanding of this metaphoric method of visualizing the law.
Assuming for the moment that we have not yet heard that evidence is
like a bridge, but are visually approaching the law of relevancy for the
first time, the starting place is with the legal text. Reading through the
chapter on relevancy in the classic hornbook, McCormick on Evidence, s
the immediate and ubiquitous nature of organizing metaphors is readily
apparent. The title of the chapter, "Relevancy and its Counterweights,"
refers to the "weight" or "weighing" of evidence." The chapter continues
to discuss how one must find a "ground" for refusing to hear evidence;
8
that evidence lacking in probative value is "speculative' or "remote";
19
that a single item of evidence is a "link in the chain of proof';20 that
some inferences do not "necessarily follow";2' and that a single piece of
evidence without proper inferences gives rise to the observation that "a
brick is not a wall."'
A close reading reveals a fundamental spatial metaphor at work in
many of these examples: relevancy describes both the distance between
the evidence offered and the issues in the case, and the distance between
the evidence presented and the proposition for which it is offered.'
McCormick states:
There are two components to relevant evidence: materiality and
probative value. Materiality looks to the relation between the
propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the
case.... [Probative value is] the tendency of evidence to establish
the proposition that it is offered to prove.
In sum, relevant evidence is evidence that in some degree
advances the inquiry.24
16. McCormick on Evidence 540 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 542.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 543.
22. Id.
23. Id, at 541-42.
24. Id, at 541, 544 (emphasis added).
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The organizing metaphor of relevancy-as-distance is furthered in the
discussion of direct and circumstantial evidence: "Direct evidence is
evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue. Circumstantial
evidence..., [if] accepted as true, [requires] additional reasoning... to
reach the proposition to which it is directed.' 2
Drawing out the metaphor of relevancy-as-distance could start with a
basic visual depiction of spatial relations. For example, relevancy could
be the distance between two sides of a gap. (Figure 3)
Relevancy
Figure 3
This simple graphic visually represents relevancy-as-distance. But is it
articulate? What do these lines represent? Are the essential elements
here? How should they be placed to accurately reflect the logic of the
law of relevancy?
These questions raise an important point: when visualizing the law,
one must keep in mind basic principles of graphic representation; one
principle is to erase all ink on the page that does not convey
information.26 Other important principles include: avoid unnecessary
ornamentation that does not add meaningful information (no
"chartjunk"); 27 maximize the information capacity of all ink, because
often lines can mean more than one thing;28 and always try to tell a story
with the graphic. 29 These principles often guide revisions and
refinements of graphics.
For instance, if relevancy is a gap between two sides, what are those
sides? As a function of logic,3" relevancy-as-gap could represent the
logical gap between a piece of evidence and the proposition for which it
is offered. (Figure 4)
25. Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
26. See Edward R. Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information 96 (1983).
27. Id. at 107.
28. Id. at 139.
29. Id. at 177.
30. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 16, at 542 ("Evidence ... is said to have 'logical
relevance."') (citations omitted).
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Evidence Proposition forI which it is offered
Logical gap
Figure 4
But why have evidence on one side of the gap? Should not the
evidence itself span the gap? It is, after all, the evidence that is or is not
relevant. Therefore, it should be the evidence that does or does not span
the gap. (Figure 5)
which it is offered
Logical gap
Figure 5
What then, is on the left side of the gap? And where do all the other
elements of relevancy, materiality, probative value, and issues in the case
go?
Notice that at this point a "dialogue" has begun between the author
and the organizing metaphor of relevancy-as-gap. In a sense, the law as
embodied in McCormick's text speaks to the author about the character
of evidentiary relevance and, by questioning that characterization, the
author speaks back to the text. This type of dialogue is the primary
method for drawing out and making explicit an organizing metaphor.
Thinking out analogies to their logical conclusions, picturing ideas, and
creatively probing to understand the deepest organizing principles of an
area of the law is an exciting and fruitful form of visualizing the law.
Going back to relevancy-as-gap, we can develop the visual metaphor
further by adding the other elements of evidentiary relevance such as
materiality, probative value, pieces of evidence, and issues in a case. If
we were to suppose that the left side of the gap is where one is before
evidentiary issues have been proved, and the right side is the place one is
trying to go, that is, the place where one's propositions are proved, then
the space between them is the logical gap one must span with pieces of
evidence.
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One legal element that might fit into the scheme is the required burden
of proof. Because the gap represents that challenge to the offeror,
widening the gap is a way to show an increased burden, from prima
facie, to a preponderance of the evidence, to clear and convincing, or to
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Figure 6)
II Prima Facie
Preponderance of the Evidence
Clear and Convincing
_____________________________Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Figure 6
While one normally must use many different types of evidence, each
type must exhibit characteristics of materiality and probative value. Since
materiality is dependent on the issues in the case to which the evidence is
directed, the placement of the evidence, represented by where the
evidence touches the other side, could correspond to materiality. If the
evidence is directed at a particular issue in the case, then it is material. If
it is directed at something that is not an issue in the case, it is not
material. (Figure 7)
#1 Material Issue #1
#2 Material Issue #2
#3 Not Material Not an issue
Figure 7
Probative value either advances an inquiry, describing evidence that is
close to the proposition for which it is offered, or describes evidence too
remote to be of value. As such, probative value could be represented by
the length of the piece of evidence. The longer the piece of evidence, the
Visualizing the Law
closer it is to the proposition for which it is offered. Since each
proposition offered corresponds to an issue in the case, probative value
can also be expressed graphically. (Figure 8)
#1 High Probative Value (Direct) Issue
#2 Low Probative Value (ndiret) Issue #2
Figure 8
Direct evidence resolves a matter in issue. A piece of evidence that
spans the gap by itself is direct evidence. A shorter piece of evidence is
circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence does not span the gap
in one piece, but if multiple pieces of such evidence fit together, they
could reach the other side. (Figure 9)
Circumstantial Evidence
Figure 9
"Spanning a logical gap," "pieces of evidence," "reaching from one side
to the other"--all these phrases and images point to a more generalized
organizing metaphor for evidentiary relevance: building a bridge.
After having interrogated the text and listened both to the logical
requirements of the law and the visual logic of the graphics, we have
arrived at the helpful image of "Evidence as a Bridge." Going through
Washington Law Review
the process of drawing out the metaphor, that is, approaching the law
visually, gives us a deeper understanding of the law than if we had
simply been given the image. Once conceived, the metaphor can be
further explored.
The burden of proof, illustrated by the width of the canyon, dictates
the logical rigor required of the evidentiary bridge one must build. If one
is to build a long bridge, the materials must be strong and well
connected. Preferably, one will have strong beams that will span the gap
by themselves (direct evidence) and not have to piece together lots of
small pieces (circumstantial evidence). Regardless of the size of the
pieces, all of the pieces require structural integrity.
Testimony, expert witnesses, forensic evidence, demonstrative and
physical evidence, and police reports are all pieces for constructing an
evidentiary bridge, like girders, rivets, asphalt, steel cables, and lumber
are pieces for building a physical bridge. The rules of evidence, insuring
the truthfulness and accuracy of evidence presented in court, are like
building specifications showing builders exactly how structurally strong,
that is, reliable, the pieces of evidence must be.
Weak pieces of evidence, even though they may span the gap, may not
support the doubt of the trier of fact. This would be the case if there were
an eyewitness whom the trier of fact did not trust. As a piece of direct
evidence, the eyewitness account should bridge the gap by itself and
support the weight of the doubt of the trier of fact. But the testimony,
although it might appear reliable and strong, is in fact corrupt and
flawed.
One could continue to spin out this metaphor and find new and more
interesting ways to conceive of the rules of evidentiary relevance. For
instance, if pieces of evidence are like pieces of building materials for a
bridge, what types of evidence are wooden beams? What types are steel
cables? Which are rivets?
While the metaphor may help one engage with the law, at a certain
point it can be distracting and no longer helpful. For example, what type
of building material is an expert witness? Frankly, who cares? How
would classifying an expert witness as wood or steel help create a legal
map that one could use to remember the law of evidence? Making legal
maps is an approach to thinking about the law, and drawing out
organizing metaphors as a way of making legal maps is a tool. Once the
metaphor or drawing takes over the analysis, however, it no longer
serves its purpose and should be abandoned.
Although there is a point at which the metaphor of "Evidence as a
Bridge" does become distracting, the process of discovering the
metaphor and drawing it out through a dialogue with the text is a very
Vol. 73:163, 1998
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helpful way to remember the law. When confronted with a concrete
evidentiary issue in an actual case, one will profit by realizing that one is
building a bridge. This type of visualization can help a lawyer recall
important elements of the law of evidence as well as how those elements
relate to each other. The evidentiary bridge must correspond to the issues
in the case and must be strong and wide enough to support the triers of
fact, with all their doubts, while helping them travel from one side of the
canyon to the other.
Sometimes organizing metaphors are more obvious than "Evidence as
a Bridge," but developing their visual details nonetheless provides an
engaging way to study and remember the law. In the next example, the
omnipresent legal metaphor of balancing organizes a famous theory of
determining negligence.
B. Learned Hand's Eight-Armed Balancing Scale
This next example of legal map-making shows how visualizing the
law can help one learn complex legal doctrines. By drawing out an
organizing metaphor and interrogating it, one can see the logical
inconsistencies, or greater patterns of logical coherence, within the legal
doctrine. The simple and common metaphor of a balance reduces the
challenge of understanding the organizing metaphor and allows one to
focus on what is being balanced, thereby focusing more on detail than on
the big picture.
In United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,3 Judge Learned Hand
presented the well-known formula of B < PL to determine negligence. In
Carroll Towing, an admiralty case, the main issue was whether the
employee in charge of a barge was negligent in being ashore when the
barge encountered difficulties and sank,32 thereby rendering the barge
company contributorily negligent.
Judge Learned Hand began his analysis by commenting that there can
be no general black-letter rule for negligence liability.33 But since
accidents do happen, there must be some way of determining a person's
negligence in a specific situation. He therefore proposed a calculus:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her
moorings,... the owner's duty.., to provide against resulting
injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she
will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she
31. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
32. Id. at 171.
33. Id. at 173.
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does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to
bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e.,
whether B less than PL.34
This idea of balancing the likelihood and magnitude of risk against the
burden of protecting against the risk was captured and expanded in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 291-93. As stated in section 291,
the cost/benefit analysis depends on whether the magnitude of the risk
outweighs the utility of the act.35 The Restatement goes on to list the
factors to be considered on each side.36
Section 292 lists the factors to be considered for determining the
utility of an actor's conduct:
In determining what the law regards as the utility of the actor's
conduct for the purpose of determining whether the actor is
negligent, the following factors are important: (a) the social value
which the law attaches to the interest which is to be advanced or
protected by the conduct; (b) the extent of the chance that this
interest will be advanced or protected by the particular course of
conduct; (c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be
adequately advanced or protected by another and less dangerous
course of conduct.37
Section 293 lists the factors for determining the magnitude of risk:
In determining the magnitude of the risk for the purpose of
determining whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are
important: (a) the social value which the law attaches to the
interests which are imperiled; (b) the extent of the chance that the
actor's conduct will cause an invasion of any interest of the other or
of one of a class of which the other is a member; (c) the extent of
the harm likely to be caused by the interests imperiled; (d) the
34. Id.
35. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 291 (1965).
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to
another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to
outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is
done.
Id.
36. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 292-93 (1965).
37. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 292.
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number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the
risk takes effect in harm.38
Drawing out the organizing metaphor of balancing and thinking
visually about this balancing process clarifies certain aspects of this legal
landscape. First, there are multiple factors to be balanced. A traditional
scale, with trays on either side of a beam, may not be sophisticated
enough to properly arrange these factors. (Figure 10)
LJ-
Figure 10
While the factors could be represented by different sized weights
placed in the trays, such a method would not distinguish between the
different types of weights, or factors, and would not be as articulate as a
scale wherein each factor had its own arm with a movable weight.
(Figure 11)
•I
•IN
Figure 11
But notice how there are only three factors on the utility side and four
on the side of magnitude of risk. How do four arms balance out three?
And which factors should be opposed to each other? What factors
represent countervailing societal interests? Once again, a dialogue has
begun in which the author has to further investigate the legal subject
matter in order to make sense of it in the mind's eye.
38. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 293.
4ii
/i
0
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Because a balance would not work any other way, each side's set of
arms will have to balance out the other side. Although there are seven
factors, three on one side and four on the other, for the purpose of visual
and logical consistency there could be one more factor implicit in the
Restatement system. 9 Our natural sense of symmetry leads us to
question the graphic and look for an eighth, "ghost" arm. The learning
that occurs while satisfying this inquisitive impulse, and the
understanding that comes upon finding that missing arm, are the benefits
of visualizing through drawing out metaphors.
In order to see the implicit factor, it is helpful to line up the counter-
balancing factors as sets. The first set is composed of section 292(a) on
the utility side40 and section 293(a) on the side of magnitude of risk.4
Section 292(a) is the social value placed on the conduct in question.42
The countervailing interest is expressed in section 293(a) as the social
value of the threatened interests. 3 Section 292(a) asks how important is
the potentially dangerous conduct? Section 293(a) asks how important
is it that the potentially injured people be allowed to participate in the
conduct that places them at risk?
For example, the law likely places a high social value on the ability of
ambulances to speed through traffic at speeds in excess of the speed
limit. The value placed on the countervailing consideration, the ability of
everyone else on the road to drive safely without having to slow down
for ambulances, is relatively low. According to Learned Hand's calculus,
the high social value placed on ambulances weighs against finding an
ambulance driver negligent.
Conversely, the law likely places a lower value on the ability of the
average citizen to speed through traffic and a higher value on the ability
of everyone else on the road to drive along without having to dodge
speeders. This valuing weighs in favor of finding the average citizen
negligent for speeding.
Visually, the ambulance example could be expressed as follows in
Figure 12.
39. See supra notes 35-38.
40. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 292(a).
41. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 293(a).
42. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 292(a).
43. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 293(a).
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292(a)
Social value of an ambulance
speeding: high
293(a)
Social value of not slowing
for ambulances: low4,
4
High Low
Value
Low High
Value
Figure 12
Likewise, the speeding citizen example could be expressed as in
Figure 13.
292(a)
Social value of a citizen
speeding: low 293(a)
Social value of not slowing
for speeding citizens: high
4 0 4
High Low
Value
High
Value
Figure 13
The next set of factors is found in sections 292(b) and 293(b) of the
Restatement. Section 292(b) is the chance that the conduct will achieve
its goal and be useful.' Section 293(b) is the chance that someone will
get hurt or an accident will happen.45
44. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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For example, if an ambulance speeds, there is a relatively high chance
that it will reach the hospital quickly and perhaps save someone's life.
Because everyone learns to let speeding ambulances have the right of
way, the chance that a speeding ambulance will get in an accident with
another person is relatively low. This could be expressed visually as
follows in Figure 14.
292(b)
Chance that ambulance will
save someone's life: high
293(b)
Chance there will be an
accident: low
4
High Low
Figure 14
Now comes the interesting part. These two sets of factors are on the
same balance; the weight distribution of one set of arms, section 292(a)
and section 293(a), affects the other set, section 292(b) and section
293(b), and vice versa. In fact, all four factors affect the entire balancing
of the scale. Placing connectors between the arms on either side could
represent this inter-connection between the factors. (Figure 15)46
/ Figure 15
Whenever one set of factors leans a certain way, it also affects the way
the other factors lean.
Keeping this inter-connectivity in mind, we can move on to the third
set of factors. The factor in Restatement section 292(c) is the chance that
the interest of the conduct can be advanced by a less dangerous
46. A keen engineering eye will see many flaws in the mechanics of this design. But remember
that it is for conceptual purposes and not intended as a blueprint.
High
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alternative,"7 that is, is there a safer way to do it? For example, are oil
tankers the only way to transport oil? Logically, the countervailing
consideration to this factor is the need to do it the dangerous way. But,
unfortunately for the logical and aesthetic symmetry of the law, no such
factor is listed in section 293. Instead, one is left with section 293(c), the
extent of the harm possible,48 and section 293(d), the number of people
potentially affected.49 Neither of these factors is the converse of section
292(c).
Although symmetry would be preferable, it makes little logical
difference whether the countervailing considerations are linked to each
other as mirror opposites. All that matters is that the factors are balanced
against each other.50 Logically, and legally, there is no reason not to
place section 292(c) adjacent to section 293(d) and balance the chance of
a less dangerous alternative (section 292(c)) against the number of
people potentially injured (section 293(d)). (Figure 16)
292(a) r - - U'11 293(a)
292(b)
292(c)
293(b)
293(d)
Mu---~ U M
292(c) Chance of a less 293(d) Number of people
dangerous alternative potentially injured
Figure 16
The remaining factor, section 293(c), the extent of harm likely to be
caused in the case of an accident,51 does not have an explicit corollary in
section 292. But the extent of harm likely to be caused is an issue of cost
in a very general sense; that is, what is the cost of the possible harm? For
instance, it is highly probable that some harm will result from the activity
of throwing a tennis ball into a crowd. But the physical, financial,
emotional, and social costs of this harm would be relatively low.
47. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 292(c).
48. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 293(c).
49. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 293(d).
50. This is not to overlook the importance of asymmetry as a valuable way to see gaps and logical
inconsistencies.
51. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 293(c).
I-D
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Alternatively, the chances that a nuclear reactor will melt down are slim.
But if it does, the costs would be astronomical.
The consideration logically corresponding to section 293(c) is the cost
of doing things safely instead of dangerously. For instance, how much
would it cost to create nuclear power elsewhere, or even not at all?
Taking the prerogative to strive for aesthetic symmetry (which often
corresponds to logical coherence) one can create an extra balancing bar
to fully incorporate the Restatement of Torts doctrine 2 and visually
represent the inherent logical symmetry. Thus, incorporating all four sets
of balancing factors, the final legal map of this vision of negligence
calculations could look like Figure 17.
UTILITY MAGNITUDE OF RISK
292(a)
292(b)
292(c)
E ... 2
293(a)
293(b)
293(d)
293(c)
Cost of alternative
Negligence circle: if the balance
hits, then the activity was
negligent
Figure 17
Although this balance may not look like any type of map in the sense of
a graphic representation of physical or logical terrain, it ultimately serves
the same purpose: helping lawyers understand negligence law and
communicate it to their clients.
Visualizing the law by drawing out organizing metaphors like the
balancing scale can deepen legal understanding and increase familiarity
with legal concepts such as the costfbenefit analysis in negligence law.
By visualizing the law, you can see the logical coherence of the law and
deepen your understanding of it.
52. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 291-93.
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II. THE TEMPLATE APPROACH TO CASE ANALYSIS
Legal maps provide conceptual clarity. The expression "I see!" often
signifies understanding. 3 Expressions such as "seeing the holes in an
opponent's argument" or "seeing differences in fact patterns" describe
forms of understanding or insight.
This Part presents a second method for making legal maps based on a
process of drawing and comparing cases. It differs from the previous two
examples, "Evidence as a Bridge" and Learned Hand's "Eight-Armed
Balancing Scale," in that instead of a drawn out metaphor or image, it is
simply a drawing of the legal elements of cases compared side by side. It
is a very useful way to synthesize cases and determine whether a case
provides strong precedential support for a legal argument. The U.S.
Supreme Court case of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.,54 provides an example of the important role case comparison plays
in legal analysis.
A. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
Popularly known as the "time-shifting" VCR case, Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. addressed the liability of Sony, a
manufacturer and vendor of home videotape recorders, to Universal
Studios and Walt Disney Productions (Universal), whose movies and
television programs were being recorded by owners of Sony's Betamax
VCRs.55 Universal sued Sony on the theory that by manufacturing,
advertising, and selling the VCRs to the public, which then arguably
infringed Universal's copyrighted movies and television shows by
recording them off the television, Sony was an indirect infringer,
vicariously liable for the Betamax-owning public's copyright
infringements.56
One of Universal's primary arguments was based on a case named
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.57 In Kalem, a film producer made an
unauthorized film version of the copyrighted book Ben Hur, which he
then distributed to wholesalers who arranged for public screenings.5 8 The
53. See, e.g., Samuel H. Solomon, Playing High-Tech Show-and-Tell in Courtroom: Chalk and
Legal Argument Are No Longer Sufficient, N.Y. L.J., May 22, 1995, at 7, 11 (discussing tests that
show how information presented to jurors verbally and visually is six times more effective than
purely verbal presentations).
54. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
55. Id. at419-20.
56. Id.
57. Id, at 435-38 (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)).
58. Id. at435.
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act of showing the film violated the original author's copyright, and, by
assisting in the advertising and making the film available for public
viewing, the film producer assisted in the copyright violation. 9
Accordingly, the Court in Kalem found the producer vicariously liable
for the direct infringement by the wholesalers.60
Universal characterized Kalem as standing for the proposition "that
supplying the 'means' to accomplish an infringing activity and
encouraging that activity through advertisement [is] sufficient to
establish liability for copyright infringement."'" Universal believed that
because Sony distributed the VCRs-the means by which the public was
infringing Universal's copyrights-Sony was vicariously liable to
Universal for the public's copyright infringements.' The Sony Court
disagreed with Universal's characterization of Kalem and considered
Kalem too factually distinguishable to provide supportive precedent. 63
By "drawing" Kalem, Universal's characterization of Kalem as
precedent, and Sony, and then comparing the three drawings, one can see
the differences between the cases and why the Court concluded that
Kalem did not provide precedential support for Universal's allegations.
B. Drawing Cases
Drawing cases consists of summarizing the essential legal elements of
a case and putting the elements on paper in a logical manner, usually in
the narrative order of how the case is explained in an opinion. The
resulting story is not so much a recounting of what happened factually,
but what the judge said happened legally.
As with any case analysis, the first step is to read the case to which
other cases will be compared. This could be the first case in a line of
cases, the seminal case in a field, or, as in the present demonstration, the
case relied upon as precedent. This initial reading should not be too
critical; it serves simply to summarize the essential legal elements of
both the specific case and all the cases with which it will be compared.
This first case provides the template for comparison and synthesis.
59. Id. at 435-36.
60. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62-63.
61. Sony, 464 U.S. at 436-37.
62. Id. at417.
63. Id. at 436.
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The essential legal elements of Kalem are as follows:
(1) plaintiff/writer of the copyrighted book Ben Hur;6
(2) defendant/movie producer who made an unauthorized movie
version of Ben Hur, based on the book;
61
(3) copyrighted work: the story of Ben Hur, in whatever form;
66
(4) act of the producer selling his movie version to wholesalers;67
(5) act of the wholesalers directly infringing the plaintiff's copyright
by showing the movie to the public.
68
Placing these elements together in a narrative/visual form yields the
simple legal story of Kalem. (Figure 18)
KALEMPanLt oDefendant/movie
Plaintiff/writer of producer made an
e sunauthorized movieth  tory of version of
Ben Hur
did not appreciate B 
siand
that the defendant distributed the
- movie to
wholesalers,
who then
I
infringed the copyright by showing it
to the public
Figure 18
From this first story, a more abstract story can be drawn to serve as a
template. The abstracted elements of the template are as follows:
(1) plaintiff/copyright owner;
(2) defendant/alleged infringer;
(3) copyrighted work;
(4) defendant's alleged act of infringement;
64. Id. at435-36.
65. Id.
66. Id
67. Id
68. Id
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(5) direct infringer;
(6) act of direct infringement.
Replacing the specific elements of Kalem with generalized categories
yields a simple template. (Figure 19)
TEMPLATE
Plaintiff owned
the © to Defendant allegedly
the work - appropriated
and did not appreciate and
that the defendant Sdid this to it
this direct
infringerI
to infringe the copyright
Figure 19
Using this template, more specific pictures of Kalem and Sony can be
drawn.
In describing Kalem, the Sony Court stressed several key issues that
should be included in an accurate picture of the case.69 First, the Court
stressed that the producer directly infringed the work when he made an
unauthorized film version, which occurred well before the film was
distributed.7" Second, the producer advertised the commercial showings,
indicating that he intended to appropriate the value of exploiting the
copyrighted work.7' Lastly, it was important that what the defendant
distributed to the wholesalers-the physical film upon which the
producer's version of Ben Hur was recorded-could only be used for an
72infringing purpose.
These additional elements should be placed in the picture of Kalem.
The producer's appropriation of the work when he made the film version
of Ben Hur is incorporated as a necessary description of the defendant.
69. Id. at 435-37.
70. Id. at 436.
71. Id. at 435-36.
72. Id. at 436.
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An additional line going from the defendant to the infringing showing of
the movie to the public can represent the defendant's incriminating
advertising. The final picture of Kalem would look like the following.
(Figure 20)
KALEM
Writer of Be Movie producer
Ben Hur, -- appropriatedthe story
made a movie and
and distributed
it to
(producer also
advertised the showing)
wholesalers
who then
infringed the © by showing it to the public
Figure 20
1. Comparing Case Drawings: Defendant's View of Kalem
Universal's picture of Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.73 is more abstract
than Kalem itself. By characterizing the case at a higher level of
abstraction, Universal tried to derive a principle, a rule, from the case;
the plaintiff made its own template. Universal abstracted the general
structure of the fact pattern in Kalem, as well as two specific elements:
supplying means for an infringing activity and encouraging infringement
through advertising.74 They contended that these two aspects constituted
a complete picture, a new rule against which the facts in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. could be compared and judged."
Notice that the appropriation of the plaintiff's copyrighted work (the
active verb attached to the defendant in Kalem) is conspicuously absent
in Universal's picture. In fact, there is no plaintiff in Universal's picture,
and the defendant need not appropriate a copyrighted work, but only
supply a means for infringing. (Figure 21)
73. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
74. Id.
75. 464 U.S. 417.
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2. The U.S. Supreme Court's Picture of Kalem
The U.S. Supreme Court critiqued Universal's "picture" of Kalem by
noting differences in the description of what the defendant supplied to
the direct infringer. According to the Court, the producer supplied both
the means and the protected work.76 In Figure 20, "made a movie and
distributed it to" stands both for the physical film given the wholesalers
and the wrongfully appropriated story of Ben Hur. In Figure 21,
Universal's characterization of Kalem is incorrect insofar as it abstracts
from "made a movie and distributed it to" to "the means for infringing a
copyright." The proper abstraction would have been from "made a movie
and distributed it to" to "the copyrighted work." (Figure 22)
THE COURT'S PICTURE OF
KALEM
The s or
infiri gin
I
the copyrighted
workI
to the direct
infringer who a
then
)efendant
suppliesI
and provides
dvertising to
infringes the ©
Figure 22
3. Sony: The Difference Between Ben Hur and a Betamax
The Court noted that in Kalem, the defendant supplied the copyrighted
work to the public, whereas in Sony, the copyright owner supplied the
work to the public themselves. This, combined with the fact that the
Betamax recorder could be used for many non-infringing activities,
distinguished Sony from the Court's picture of Kalem. (Figure 23)
76. Id. at 436-37.
|
.4 1
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Besides noticing the difference in the factual subject matter and the
parties, one can look at this drawing of the cases and see how different
Kalem is from Sony.
If one were to come across a similar fact pattern in practice and find
himself or herself in this area of the legal landscape, drawing out the new
picture and laying it down next to these pictures would indicate how
similar or dissimilar the new case was from prior precedent. This, in turn,
would inform the strategy for navigating the landscape of vicarious
liability in copyright law.
III. CONCLUSION
As the twenty-first century approaches, computing technology will
continue to simultaneously liberate our imaginations and bury our hopes
in an avalanche of information. Lawyers naturally create mental maps of
the law to see where to go and to help situate themselves with respect to
the landmarks of precedent and past experience. As the pace of the
practice of law increases, this process will need to be more explicit. In
the not too distant future, the ability to visualize the law and make legal
maps may be the quintessential skills of a lawyer.
It is hoped that the methods and examples presented in this Comment
will increase awareness of the power and promise of visualization. But
the specific processes and methods used in this Comment are by no
means exclusive, exhaustive, or ideal. Visualization as a discipline is in
its early stages. Visual thinking in practice would likely consist of hastily
written, hand-scratched flow charts, doodles, and line drawings. Indeed,
quick sketches may be the ideal expression and organizing method for
visually thinking about the law.
Visualization is an approach to thinking about the law, not a graphics
project. The point is not to be an artist, but a clear-thinking attorney. The
clearest thinking attorneys are often those with the most accurate and
refined mental maps of the law. They know where they stand legally, and
they know what avenues are available. Approaching the law through the
mind's eye and learning to create legal maps will without question
increase an attorney's ability to think clearly and navigate the legal
landscape. And as the legal landscape becomes more and more complex
and difficult to predict, the ability to create a map may be the only way to
know where you are going.
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